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ABSTRACT 
 
New Public Management (NPM) reforms have been adopted worldwide since the mid-1970s to 
improve government effectiveness and efficiency. The basic premise of NPM reforms is that mar-
ket orientation and management focus in the public sector will enhance effectiveness and efficiency 
of service delivery (Christensen and Lægreid 2010). Although NPM reforms have existed for a 
quarter century, we still have limited understanding of whether NPM reforms fulfill their expecta-
tions. Most importantly, very few empirical studies have been conducted that actually assess the 
impact of NPM reforms on performance (Alonso, Clifton, and Díaz-Fuentes 2015, Dahlström, 
Nistotskaya, and Tyrberg 2016, Hammerschmid and Van de Walle 2011). This study helps fill this 
gap by examining the effect of different NPM-type reforms on municipal performance. In particu-
lar, we assess the impact of NPM reforms on three dimensions of municipal performance – gender 
equity, efficiency and effectiveness – by using a data set of 810 city-level Japanese municipalities. 
Findings show that municipalities’ overall effort to create NPM reforms is not associated with gen-
der equity and effectiveness in revenue expansion. However, findings suggest that municipalities 
with a higher commitment to various NPM- type reforms are likely to operate with lower adminis-
trative overhead costs. Results also suggest that municipalities’ efforts supporting individual reform, 
including outsourcing and municipal assets and debt management reform, are associated with high-
er efficiency in overhead costs and increased revenues from selling municipal assets. This study 
tests the impacts of NPM-type reforms on municipal performance in an understudied Asian devel-
oped setting.  
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Introduction 
Worldwide, scholars and practitioners have searched for the factors and practices that improve 
governmental performance. This search has intensified since the early 1980s with the advent of 
New Public Management (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), which has generated greater concern for 
government performance and led to adopting market practices (Hood 1991, Walker et al. 2011). As 
a result, private sector practices and strategies have been promoted and implemented in public 
organizations with the goal of boosting performance (Christensen and Lægreid 2011, Diefenbach 
2009, Hyndman and Lapsley 2016). One of the basic assumptions is that strong external pressure 
exists and public organizations need a new strategy to change and sustain themselves through mar-
ketization and use of private sector approaches (Diefenbach 2009). Core components of NPM 
typically include hands-on professional management, explicit standards and performance measure-
ments, emphasis on outputs controls, disaggregation and decentralization, competition in public 
service provisions, stress on private sector management practices, and discipline and parsimony in 
resource use (Hood 1991).  
Although NPM reforms have been used for a quarter century, we still have limited under-
standing of whether those reforms fulfill their expectations. Most importantly, very few empirical 
studies have been conducted that actually assess the impacts of NPM reforms on performance 
(Alonso, Clifton, and Díaz-Fuentes 2015, Dahlström, Nistotskaya, and Tyrberg 2016, Ham-
merschmid and Van de Walle 2011). Hammerschmid and Van de Walle (2011) lament such paucity 
of empirical studies of NPM reforms and describe the area as an “empirical desert” (p.11). To fill 
this research gap, some studies conduct literature reviews of previous studies on NPM. For in-
stance, by reviewing 519 studies on the impact of NPM reforms across Europe, Pollitt and Dan 
(2013) found that few studies examine the impact of NPM reforms on outputs as well as outcomes. 
Only 26.6 percent of previous studies examined include entries for changes in outputs or outcomes. 
Furthermore, many studies found negative effects of NPM-type reforms on outcomes and outputs. 
They also found many previous studies do not discover any changes. A review of the NPM litera-
ture in central and eastern Europe by Dan and Pollitt (2015) finds that some of NPM tools, includ-
ing performance management, quality improvement, and agency creation, have positively affected 
organizational performance or public service delivery. This literature suggests we still have a limited 
understanding of how NPM-type reforms affect organizational performance and social outcomes. 
Furthermore, although NPM-type reforms are global phenomenon, spread across both developed 
and developing countries (Diefenbach 2009), relatively fewer studies have assessed the impacts of 
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NPM reforms on performance in Asian developed settings, especially Japan, compared to a large 
volume of studies examining Oceanian, North American and European countries.  
The goal of this paper is to examine the impacts of NPM reforms on the following three 
dimensions of municipal performance – gender equity, efficiency in municipal spending, and effec-
tiveness in revenue expansion – by using a data set of Japanese municipalities. Although many stud-
ies examine efficiency and effectiveness in public service provisions as main targets of NPM re-
forms, the link between NPM efforts and gender has been largely overlooked in previous empirical 
studies. A few existing studies suggest the rise of NPM weakens the power of women in local poli-
tics and strengthens men’s power in leading management positions (Hedlund 2013) and makes 
“entrepreneurial masculinity” culture dominant in public organizations (Davies and Thomas 2002). 
Our first goal is to test how municipalities’ NPM efforts influence gender equality in managerial 
positions in the administrative body. Our second goal is to assess how NPM reform efforts are 
associated with efficiency in municipal spending operationalized by administrative overhead costs 
and personnel costs. Finally, our third goal is to test the impacts of NPM reforms efforts on effec-
tiveness in revenue expansion and financial management.  
This study uses a case of Japanese municipalities. Japan is a suitable case for analysis for 
several reasons. First, many local governments in Japan started to adopt NPM approaches in the 
late 1990s (Kudo 2015). However, as is true in studies in other developed countries, we still have 
limited empirical understanding about the effects of NPM on municipal performance. Most existing 
studies tend to make ideological or descriptive arguments. Secondly, Japan exhibits lower levels of 
female political representation compared with other developed and developing countries (Bochel 
and Bochel 2005, Eto 2010, Khatwani , Mikanagi 2001). Japan still lags behind other advanced 
countries when it comes to gender equality in general. For instance, Japan ranks very low among 
developed nations in indicators, such as maternal employment rates, gender gap in full-time earn-
ings and ratio of women in managerial positions. Japan’s gender gap is large and persistent 
(Estévez-Abe 2013).  
Therefore, this study tests how NPM-type reforms affect gender equality in local gov-
ernments within in a context of relatively lower level of female representation, both in politics and 
society within advanced democracies (Ogai 2001, Eto 2010, Bochel and Bochel 2005, Bochel et al. 
2003, World Economic Forum n.d., UNDP 2016). Thirdly, Japanese local governments have simi-
lar administrative structures regardless of their geographic location and municipal size, thus allow-
ing us to control for institutional factors. Fourthly, Japanese regions are less diverse with respect to 
culture, ethnicity and economy, compared to other developed countries. For instance, regional 
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disparities in unemployment rates were the lowest, and regional differences in GDP per capita were 
the fifth lowest among OECD countries (OECD 2014). Therefore, such homogeneity helps us to 
control for other factors that may potentially influence dependent variables. Finally, despite the fact 
that Japan is an advanced democratic country, Japanese local governments have been studied less in 
the English literature of public administration, compared to those in Western European and North 
American countries. Examining this understudied setting helps us to build better theories of the 
municipal size-performance relationship and municipal merger, which responds to the recent in-
creasing interest in contextual factors in public management (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 
2017) and comparative and international perspectives in public administration (Jreisat 2002, 
Fitzpatrick et al. 2011, Raadschelders and Lee 2011, Jreisat 2005, Hou et al. 2011).  
This study is organized into five sections. The first section reviews what has been studied 
about the impacts of NPM on municipal performance, and provides the rationale for testing the 
NPM effects on selected three dimensions of municipal performance. The second section provides 
background information on Japanese local governments and NPM reforms in Japan. The third 
section describes the research design and variable operationalization, followed by a fourth section 
containing results and analysis. The fifth section presents conclusions, limitations of this research 
and future study agendas. 
 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT: NPM REFORMS AND MUNICIPAL PER-
FORMANCE 
NPM was introduced to public organizations in the late 1970s, with the hope of improving perfor-
mance of public sector organizations by adopting business-like styles of management (Diefenbach 
2009). Most NPM efforts have common goals: 1) improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
public sector, 2) enhancing responsiveness of public organizations to their customers, 3) reducing 
public expenditure, and 4) improving accountability of public sector managers (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2011). NPM generally aims at these goals through three approaches: disaggregation, com-
petition and incentivization (Dunleavy et al. 2006). Disaggregation includes agentification, devel-
opment of quasi-government agencies and improved performance measurement. Competition in-
cludes outsourcing, intragovernment contracting, deregulation and enhancing user control. Incen-
tivization includes privatizing asset ownership, performance-related pay, public-private partnership 
and valuing public sector equity (Dunleavy et al. 2006).  
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Although significant attention has been given to efficiencies and effectiveness in organiza-
tional performance in previous studies about NPM, relatively less scholarly attention has been paid 
to empirical links between NPM and gender representation in public organizations. Several previ-
ous studies show concern for negative effects of NPM-type reforms on gender equality in public 
organizations. The rise of NPM weakens the power of women in local politics and strengthens 
men’s power in leading management positions (Hedlund 2013), as well as giving privileges to mas-
culinity and enhancing masculine culture within public organizations (Davies and Thomas 2002, 
Hedegaard and Ahl 2013). Furthermore, previous studies of private companies suggest a gender 
difference exists in attitudes toward risk perception. In the private sector, literature on gender and 
financial behavior has reported a strong link exists between gender and individual preference and 
behavior regarding financial decision making (Barber and Odean 2001, Bernasek and Shwiff 2001, 
Charness and Gneezy 2012, Croson and Gneezy 2009, Eckel and Grossman 2002, 2008, Filippin 
and Crosetto 2016, Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Schubert et al. 1999). Specifically, these studies 
find that women, when compared with men, exhibit more risk aversion about financial risk taking.i 
Given that the nature of NPM introduces business approaches to public sector organizations and 
encourages public officials to be more risk-takers and entrepreneurial, one may expect commitment 
to NPM-type reforms may discourage gender equity in public organizations. Therefore, our first 
proposition is:  
H1: NPM reform efforts are negatively associated with gender equity in public organizations. 
Increasing efficiency in public sector organizations is one of NPM’s core values (Diefen-
bach 2009, Hood 1991). Efficiency is highly promoted in private sector management. In the public 
sector, efficiency can be achieved through various NPM-type tools, such as performance measure-
ment, pay-for-performance, establishment of management culture, customer-orientation, outsourc-
ing and privatization.  Accordingly, 
H2: Municipalities having stronger commitment to NPM reforms are more likely to exhibit higher public 
spending efficiency, all other factors being equal. 
 
Finally, NPM reforms attempt to develop business-like attitudes (Diefenbach 2009) and 
promote entrepreneurial and innovative behavior of public sector employees. In addition, NPM’s 
emphasis on managerialism and decentralization in decision-making has the potential to boost ef-
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fectiveness in achieving organizational goals. Incentivization and deregulation also help public or-
ganizations to achieve results. Therefore,  
H3: Municipalities having stronger commitment to NPM reforms are more likely to achieve higher effec-
tiveness in revenue expansion and financial management, all other factors being equal. 
 
CASE SELECTION: JAPANESE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Japan adopted a unitary political and administrative system with a two-tier local government sys-
tem: prefecture as regional government units and municipality as local government units. Munici-
palities, in turn, are categorized as cities, towns and villages. As of April 2014, Japan has 47 prefec-
tures and 1,718 municipalities, and of these, 790 are cities, 745 are towns and 183 are villages (MIC 
2014). Although some municipalities have additional responsibilities depending on population size, 
basically all municipalities have the same powers and similar responsibilities, such as providing so-
cial relief, nursing insurance, national health insurance, etc. (MIC n.d.-a).ii  
Japanese local government structure consists of the legislative branch and executive branch. The 
relationship between legislative and executive bodies is classified as a “strong mayor” system in the 
United States. The chief executive holds the exclusive power over all executive agencies (CLAIR 
2013, Kawasaki 2000). Japanese local governments have adopted a presidential system, in which 
both the mayor and the local assembly members are directly elected by voters. The mayor and the 
local assembly are separate and independent entities. Unlike the diversity of local government struc-
tures in the U.S., this Japanese structure has been adopted uniformly across municipalities (CLAIR, 
2013). Mayors’ rights include enacting regulations, preparing budgets, proposing bills and appoint-
ing or dismissing staff. Local assemblies have voting rights in matters regarding budget and ordi-
nances, and they can conduct a no-confidence vote with respect to mayors.  
Female representation in local government is considerably low. Female mayors are very 
few. In 2016, only 21 females were mayors in the 1,721 city, town or village-level municipalities, so 
they led only 1.2 percent of all municipalities. Likewise in 2016, the average share of female local 
councilors in municipal assemblies was 12.6 percent for all municipalities. However, across munici-
palities, considerable variation exists in female representation in local councils (Cabinet Office of 
Japan 2016). Nevertheless, women’s representation in local administration is relatively higher than 
female representation at the national administrative level. In 2015, the average percentage of female 
local officials who held more than middle-level managerial positions was 12.6 percent in all city, 
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town and village-level municipalities, compared with 3.3 percent at the national level (Cabinet 
Office of Japan 2015a, 2015b).  
Many local governments in Japan started to adopt NPM in the mid/late 1990s (Kudo 
2015). NPM tools primarily introduced include performance measurement, program evaluation, 
customer satisfaction surveys, outsourcing to the private sector, PFI (private finance initiatives), 
and public-private partnership (Kudo 2015). Although NPM was introduced to Japanese municipal-
ities more than 20 years ago, recent survey results for Japanese municipalities show that municipali-
ties still give very strong attention to NPM (Kudo 2015).  
 
DATA COLLECTION AND VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Our analysis includes 810 city-level municipalities from 
2013 to 2014. Towns and villages were excluded because of the unavailability of certain variables. 
Administrative reform data, which make up the main independent variables in this study, are ob-
tained from MIC’s (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) annual survey of administra-
tive reform in municipal governments (MIC n.d.-b). MIC conducts annual surveys to collect infor-
mation about administrative reforms that municipalities are currently implementing. The surveys 
are distributed to all municipalities and collected by MIC. Results are disclosed in the MIC’s website. 
The survey asks whether or not municipalities currently have any plan or strategy for administrative 
reform, the reform menus on which local governments focus, reform contents and the existence of 
specific numerical goals of reform. Gender representation data in local governments is obtained 
from the Gender Equality Bureau in the Cabinet Office of Japan (2015, 2013). Other dependent 
variables are collected from Regional Statistics (MIC 2015) and Settlement of Municipality Finances (MIC 
2014-2015). Mayoral political and local council data are obtained from List of Local Chief Executives 
(Chihō Jichi Sōgo ̄ Kenkyu ̄jo 2013-2014). Other control variables are from MIC (2015) and MIC 
(2014-2015). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This study assesses the impacts of NPM reforms on different dimensions of municipal perfor-
mance. We focus on the following dimensions of municipal performance: equity, efficiency and 
effectiveness of municipal performance. As a dimension of equity, this study specifically tests the 
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NPM effects on gender representation in managerial positions in local governments. Although 
many NPM-related existing studies do not place gender as a central research topic, existing studies 
suggest the rise of NPM weakens the power of women in local politics and strengthens the men’s 
power in leading management positions (Hedlund 2013) and makes “entrepreneurial masculinity” 
culture dominant in public organizations (Davies and Thomas 2002). We hypothesize that NPM 
efforts are negatively associated with gender equality in managerial positions in local governments. 
We operationalize gender equality in the local administrative body as a percentage of female offi-
cials in managerial positions. Despite considerable improvement in the last decade, Japanese female 
representation in politics has been significantly low, compared with other developed and develop-
ing countries. According to a survey conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Japan’s share of 
women in the lower house of parliaments reached only 9.5 percent in 2016, ranking Japan 155 out 
of 193 surveyed countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). Female representation in local gov-
ernment is considerably low. Female mayors are very few. In 2016, there were only 21 female 
mayors in all 1,721 city, town, and village-level municipalities, so they made up only 1.2 percent of 
all municipalities’ leaders. Likewise in 2016, the average share of local councilors in municipal as-
semblies was 12.6 percent for all municipalities. Nevertheless, women’s representation in local ad-
ministrations is relatively higher than female representation at the national administrative level. In 
2015, the average percentage of female local officials who held higher than middle-level managerial 
positions was 12.6 percent in all city, town and village-level municipalities, compared with 3.3 per-
cent at the national level (Cabinet Office of Japan 2015a, 2015b).  
We use the following three measurements as indicators for efficiency in municipal spend-
ing: 1) local government’s administrative costs per capita, 2) number of local officials per 1,000 
residents, and 3) personnel costs per capita. While the first measurement aims at capturing efficien-
cy in overhead costs of municipalities, the other two measurements examine efficiency in terms of 
human resources. These measurements often are used as indicators for efficiency of municipal 
organizational performance in public administration literature. Administrative costs cover general 
administrative overhead expenses, such as employee salary for general affairs department, building 
and maintenance costs of local government facilities, retirement pay for local officials and other 
common costs for administrative activities. Personnel costs include salary and retirement payment 
for mayors, executives and general full-time employees, salary payment for part-time employees, 
local council salary, payment for administrative commission members and other personnel-related 
payment.  
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Finally, effectiveness in revenue expansion and financial management is operationalized 
with two distinctive indicators: 1) revenues from municipal assets sale per capita, and 2) accumulat-
ed municipal debts per capita. Due to increasing debt and declining population and economic con-
ditions, many local governments have faced unprecedented financial pressure. Restoring deteriorat-
ing public finances through spending cuts and revenue expansion has been one of the primary goals 
for most municipalities in Japan. Since declining and aging populations make it difficult for local 
officials to safely rely on revenue expansion through tax increases, local governments need to con-
sider other tools for revenue expansion. Major tools for revenue expansion include: (1) enhancing 
tax revenue collection, (2) sales, (3) leases and management of municipal properties, and (4) increas-
ing fees and charges (Research Institute for Local Government 2011).  
An amendment to the Local Autonomy Act in 2006 granted power to localities to obtain 
revenues by utilizing their own assets, such as landed property and movable property (e.g. leasing, 
sales). While most Japanese local governments largely depend on transfers from central government 
agencies, they also seek to expand their revenues through locally controlled channels, such as en-
hancing tax revenue collection, sales, lease and management of municipal properties, and increasing 
fees and charges (Research Institute for Local Government 2011). In this study, we focus on reve-
nue expansion from sales of municipal facilities. We also use outstanding local government bonds 
per capita as an indicator for sound financial management. Values of all expense variables are in 
thousand Japanese Yen (which is equivalent to approximately $10 U.S.). All variables except the 
gender representation variable are logged in order to reduce skewedness.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: MEASURING THE NPM EFFORT OF 
MUNICIPALITIES 
This study assesses the impacts of NPM reforms on municipal performance. We look at local gov-
ernments’ efforts supporting various NPM-type reforms as an indicator of their effort in backing 
NPM reforms. MIC’s annual survey on administrative reform in local governments (MIC n.d.-b) 
asks whether or not local governments currently embark on various administrative menus. Such 
reform menus include review of wage system, outsourcing, cuts in expenditure and revenue expan-
sion, review of organizational structure and management style, human resource development, col-
laboration with local citizens, promotion of information disclosure and transparency in administra-
tive work. The 2013 version of the survey asks slightly different reform menus from those in the 
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2014 survey. However, we select reform menus that are common in both survey versions. Then, we 
particularly look at reform menus that are closely related to the concept of NPM. This led us to 
select the following six reform items: 1) outsourcing, 2) human resource development, 3) govern-
ment assets and debts management, 4) organizational structure and management style, 5) collabora-
tion with citizens, and 6) information disclosure and transparency. The survey does not specify 
definition of each reform menu. The survey asks if a municipality is currently implementing admin-
istrative reform in each area (yes or no). Then, it also asks if a municipality sets a specific numeric 
goal for the reform it selects (yes or no). In fact, most municipalities select “yes” for the first ques-
tion, which means they embark on the administrative reform. Thus, we particularly look at the sec-
ond question to measure municipalities’ level of engagement in and commitment to NPM-type 
reform. We assume municipalities are more committed to NPM reforms if they set any specific 
numeric indicators for the reform they are planning or implementing. Combining these two ques-
tions, we categorized municipalities into three groups: 1) municipalities not implementing given 
administrative reform menu, 2) municipalities implementing reform without any specific numerical 
target, and 3) municipalities carrying out reform with a specific numerical goal. We give a value of 
“0” for the first group, “1” for the second group, and “2” for the third group. This is an ordinal 
variable. The higher the value, the more commitment a municipality has for administrative reform. 
Since we examine the above six areas of administrative reform, we repeat the same process for each 
reform menu. That led us to create an ordinal variable (0, 1, and 2) in each of the six reform areas. 
Figure 1 shows a graphic percent summary of each variable. Our study is primarily interested in the 
combined effects of NPM effort on municipal performance. Therefore, we created a factor variable, 
NPM reform index, that captures the overall NPM reform effort of municipalities based on the above 
six ordinal variables with principal-component factor analysis. Cronbach's alpha is 0.7, which passes 
a conventional guideline for the reliability of the scale. NPM reform index is an additive index by 
summing the above six variables. The index ranges from 0 to 12. Higher values indicate more effort 
for and engagement in NPM reforms. Figure 2 shows a percent summary of NPM reform index. 
We also examine how reform efforts of municipalities in individual reform affect municipal 
performance. Therefore, our second independent variable is the above mentioned ordinal variable 
for an individual reform. Since we are not able to include all six separate reform variables in the 
same model due to multicollinearity, we decided to focus on 1) outsourcing, 2) government assets 
and debts management, and 3) organizational structure and management style.  
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CONTROL VARIABLES 
This study controls for other factors expected to influence municipal performance. Such factors 
include: 1) municipal merger, 2) female mayor or vice mayor, 3) mayor’s vote share and reelection 
times, 4) number of political parties supporting mayor, 5) unemployment rate, 6) senior citizens, 7) 
prefecture dummy, 8) special status city dummy, and 9) year dummy. Municipal merger is a dummy 
variable which indicates whether or not a municipality experienced municipal merger after 1999. 
The central government of Japan carried out a nationwide municipal merger reform from 1999 to 
2006, which reduced the number of municipalities from 3,229 in 1999 to 1,821 in 2006 (Yokomichi 
2007). This number continued to decrease gradually to 1,718 in 2014 (MIC 2014).iii Merged munici-
palities gained financial benefits from the central government. In addition, experiencing such pre-
funding change causes numerous short-term effects on organizational performance, such as con-
flicts in organizational rule and norms among merger partners, employee motivation, and time and 
energy required to get to know different stake holders and citizens (Suzuki 2016). Thus, we expect 
that municipal merger negatively or positively affects municipal performance (Suzuki and 
Avellaneda 2016, Steiner and Kaiser 2016, Reingewertz 2012). Female mayor or vice mayor is a binary 
variable which indicates whether or not a municipality has either a female mayor or vice-mayor. 
Female mayors are very few, with only 21 in 2016 in 1,721 cities, towns or villages (Cabinet Office 
of Japan 2016). Therefore, we also include female vice-mayors as an indicator for gender represen-
tation in executive positions. We expect the gender of mayor or vice-mayor may affect gender rep-
resentation in managerial positions. It also can affect spending patterns of municipal performance, 
as previous studies suggest (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Smith 2014, Holman 2014). Mayors’ 
vote share in the last election is a continuous variable, reported as a percentage. We also control for 
the number of mayor’s reelections, as we expect long-term experience as a mayor should influence 
performance of municipalities (Avellaneda 2009a, b). As many mayoral candidates run without 
party affiliation, we control for the number of political parties that publicly support the elected 
mayor. It is a continuous variable, ranging from 0 to 6. We also controlled for socio-economic fac-
tors, including percentages for the unemployment rate and number of senior citizens. In addition, 
we also used a prefecture dummy and a year dummy.  
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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The goal of this paper is to estimate any (negative) effects of NPM reforms on three dimensions of 
municipal performance (equity, efficiency and effectiveness) by using a panel data of 810 city-level 
Japanese municipalities from 2013 to 2014. The current data sets cover only two years due to una-
vailability of some data. We mainly use random-effects models with clustered standard errors at the 
city-level. We cannot use a fixed-effect model because some variables, such as municipal merger, 
mayors’ vote share, reelection times, and mayor’s political party support, do not change across time 
for most municipalities unless they held elections during the data set period. iv  As a robustness 
check, we estimated pooled OLS and population-averaged regression models.  
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Table 3 reports results of random effects models for six different dependent variables. Recall that 
our first explanatory variable is NPM reform index, which is a factor variable composed from local 
governments’ efforts for NPM-type reforms in six areas. Model 1 tests how NPM reforms affect 
equity by using gender representation in managerial positions. The result shows that NPM reforms 
negatively affect gender representation. However, the result fails to reach a statistically significant 
level. Models 2-4 test the impacts of NPM on efficiency in municipal spending. In Model 2, we test 
how NPM influences general administrative costs. Results show the NPM reform index is negative-
ly associated with administrative costs per capita, holding other factors constant (p-value<0.05). 
The higher a municipality’s NPM effort, the lower administrative overhead costs are. Recall that the 
dependent variable is logged and the independent variable is non-logged. Thus, this is a log-linear 
model regression. Coefficient of NPM reform index is -0.01. This means that one unit increase in 
NPM reform index reduces approximately 1 percent of administrative overhead per capita. Munici-
pal merger increases overhead costs (p-value<0.1).  
Municipalities managed by a mayor with larger vote share tend to have lower administra-
tive costs (p-value<0.05). Factors, such as unemployment rate and status as a special city, negatively 
influence administrative costs, holding other factors constant. In the model estimating local gov-
ernment officials, coefficient of NPM reform index is negative but not at the statistically significant 
confidence level. Municipalities that experienced merger and have higher percentages of senior 
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citizens, which tend to be in rural areas, are likely to have a higher number of local government 
officials. Unemployment negatively influences the dependent variable (p-value<0.01).  
Model 4 tests the impact of NPM reforms on personnel costs. Again, NPM reform index 
is negative. However, the coefficient is very small and fails to pass statistically significant criteria. 
Municipalities with more reelected mayors are likely to have higher personnel costs (p-value< 0.05), 
and cities with special status by law also are likely to record higher personnel costs. The percentage 
of senior citizens positively influences the dependent variable.  
Models 5-6 test the effects of NPM reforms on effectiveness in revenue expansion and fi-
nancial management. NPM reforms are positively associated with revenue expansion from munici-
pal asset sales. But the coefficient fails to reach the statistically significant level of confidence. NPM 
reforms are negatively correlated to the amount of outstanding municipal debts. Likewise, however, 
it fails to pass statistical significant tests. These results suggest NPM reforms do not influence most 
dimensions of municipal performance covered in this study except administrative overhead costs. 
We run the same models with pooled OLS regression models, as well as population-averaged re-
gression models. Results show that NPM reforms also negatively affect administrative costs in both 
models, which confirms the robustness of our result. Results are reported in tables A1 and A2 in 
appendix. Figure 3 visualized predicted probabilities of administrative costs/capita as the NPM 
reform index increases. As seen from the figure, increases in NPM reform index leads to lower 
administrative costs, holding other factors fixed. This confirms our second proposition.  
Table 4 reports results from random effects models with individual reform variables as an 
explanatory variable. Recall that we used ordinal variables for individual reform menus, namely 
outsourcing, government assets and debts management, and organizational structure and manage-
ment style. We focus on these three important reform areas, rather than using all six reform menus, 
in order to avoid multicollinearity. In the first models (Models 1.1., 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1), we 
include only the outsourcing variable as an independent variable. The second models use the gov-
ernment assets and debts management variable instead of the outsourcing variable. The third mod-
els use the organization and management style variable as an independent variable. Finally, the 
fourth models use all of these three independent variables.  
Results are reported in table 4. Control variables are not reported in the table. In the gen-
der representation model (Models 1.1-1.4), municipalities implementing outsourcing reform are 
likely to achieve 0.97-1.07 percent lower female representation compared with those who do not 
implement an administrative reform that includes outsourcing (p-value<0.1) (Models 1.1 and 1.4). 
Coefficient of municipalities implementing outsourcing reform with numerical targets are negative, 
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however, it fails to reach a statistically significant level. Results from Models 1.2 and 1.3 do not 
show any statistically significant results regarding the effects of two specific reforms on gender 
representation. Models 2.1-2.4 test the impacts of individual NPM reforms on administrative costs. 
The result of Model 2.1 shows that municipalities implementing outsourcing reform with a specific 
numerical goal are likely to record lower administrative costs per capita than those municipalities 
without outsourcing reform (p-value<0.05). Those embarking on outsourcing reform without nu-
merical goals also record lower overhead costs than those municipalities without outsourcing re-
form (p-value<0.1). Municipalities implementing municipal assets and debts management also have 
lower administrative costs than those municipalities without reform (p-value<0.1). In the local gov-
ernment official models (3.1-3.4), coefficients of all reform variables do not reach a statistically 
significant level. In the personnel costs model (4.1-4.4), municipalities having organization and 
management style reform without numerical targets record slightly higher personnel costs than 
those without reform (p-value<0.1). Models 5.1-5.4 show results of revenues from municipal asset 
sales. Municipalities embarking on outsourcing reform with specific numeric goals obtain more 
revenues from selling off municipal facilities or assets than those not implementing outsourcing 
reform (p-value< 0.05). Coefficients of municipalities having government assets and debts man-
agement reform are positive for both municipalities with or without numerical specific goals (p-
values<0.05 and 0.1) (Model 5.2). In outstanding municipal debts models (Models 6.1-6.4), munici-
palities having organizational and management style reform with specific numerical targets record 
lower outstanding debt amounts compared with those not implementing reform. 
 To summarize main findings, outsourcing reform without numerical goals negatively af-
fects gender representation. However, the result is significant only at the 90 percent level (Models 
1.1 and 1.4). Therefore, it is not certain whether or not NPM-type reforms negatively affect gender 
representation. With respect to efficiency in municipal spending, outsourcing reform with specific 
numerical goals increases efficiency in administrative costs (i.e. reducing overhead costs/capita) at 
the 95 percent level (Model 2.1). Organizational and management style reform increases personnel 
costs but only at the 90 percent confidence level (Models 4.3 and 4.4). Thus, we cannot conclude 
that the result provides empirical support for personnel costs. Outsourcing and government assets 
and debt management reforms increase municipal revenue from assets sale at the 95 percent level 
(Models 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). Thus, the results provide an empirical support for our third proposition.  
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DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE STUDY 
This study assesses the impacts of NPM-type administrative reforms on municipal performance by 
using a data set of 810 Japanese city-level municipalities from the 2013-2014 period. In this study, 
our first goal was to test whether NPM reforms influence equity in gender representation in the 
administrative body or not. Our second goal was to test whether or not NPM reforms increase 
efficiency in municipal spending. Our third goal was to assess the impacts of NPM reforms on 
effectiveness in revenue expansion and financial management. After controlling for potential co-
founding factors, findings show that NPM reforms as a whole are not associated with gender repre-
sentation and effectiveness in revenue expansion and financial management. However, results show 
that municipalities conducting NPM reforms with higher commitment are likely to have lower ad-
ministrative overhead costs than those with less commitment to reform.  
Results of analysis testing individual NPM reform efforts suggest a relationship between 
embarkation of reform and efficiency and effectiveness in municipal performance. Municipalities 
that have a higher commitment to outsourcing reform are likely to operate at lower administrative 
overhead costs than those without outsourcing reform commitment. Results also suggest munici-
palities implementing outsourcing reform with stronger commitment also are likely to gain more 
municipal revenues from selling municipal assets. Municipalities that carry out reforms on govern-
ment assets and debt management also are likely to have larger revenue from sales of municipal 
property. Thus, municipalities’ efforts for such individual reforms (outsourcing and government 
assets and debt management) seem to influence efficiency and effectiveness of municipal perfor-
mance.  
Our study mainly examines immediate impacts of NPM-type reforms on municipal per-
formance in Japanese municipalities due to data unavailability. Future study should expand a data 
set and examine long-term effects of NPM reforms on performance (Hood and Dixon 2016). Cur-
rently, our data set does not contain information about municipalities’ prior commitment to NPM 
reforms before the data set period (2013-2014). Therefore, our results may contain reverse causali-
ty. Furthermore, future study should include other factors that may potentially influence municipal 
performance, such as managerial capacities and quality and political factors, and examine how these 
factors moderate the impact of NPM reforms on performance.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
TABLE 1, (DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS)  
  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
    Gender representation in mid-level managerial position 11.49 7.29 0 44 
Administrative costs /capita 67.53 90.89 21.38 1,983.91 
Number of local government officials/capita 5.85 1.78 2.57 16.48 
Personnel costs/capita 70.36 20.93 32.38 247.94 
Revenues from municipal assets sale/capita 1.51 2.89 0.00 53.14 
Accumulated municipal debts/capita 447.90 245.01 17.04 4,198.94 
Independent variables 
    
NPM indicator 6.20 1.87 0 12 
Administrative reform item     
Outsourcing 1.14 0.46 0 2 
Human resource development 1.04 0.43 0 2 
Government assets and debts management 1.10 0.55 0 2 
Organization and management style 0.99 0.38 0 2 
Collaboration with citizen 1.06  0.56  0 2 
Information disclosure and transparency 0.87  0.54  0 2 
Controls 
    
Municipal merger 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Female mayor or vice mayor 0.04 0.18 0 1 
Mayor's vote share (%) 44.00 27.15 0 94.15 
Mayor's reelection times 2.07 0.98 1 7 
Number of political party supporting mayor 0.84 1.23 0 6 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.55 1.65 2.6 18.2 
Senior citizens (%) 25.05 5.22 11.7 43.8 
Prefecture dummy 21.74 13.04 1 47 
Special status city dummy 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Year dummy 0.50 0.50 0 1 
 25 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Gender representation in mid-level managerial position 1
2 Administrative costs /capita -0.04 1
3 Number of local government officials/capita -0.03 0.31 1
4 Personnel costs/capita -0.05 0.28 0.89 1
5 Revenues from municipal assets sale/caåita 0.00 0.40 0.11 0.14 1
6 Accumulated municipal debts/capita -0.03 0.19 0.55 0.53 0.10 1
7 NPM indicator -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 1
8 Outsourcing -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.66 1
9 Human resource development -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 0.65 0.31 1
10 Government assets and debts management 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.62 0.38 0.24 1
11 Organization and management style -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.54 0.30 0.27 0.20 1
12 Collaboration with citizen -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 -0.07 0.69 0.32 0.36 0.27 0.22 1
13 Information disclosure and transparency -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.67 0.26 0.39 0.21 0.27 0.37 1
14 Municipal merger -0.06 0.06 0.27 0.22 -0.04 0.33 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 1
15 Female mayor or vice mayor 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 1
16 Mayor's vote share (%) 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04 -0.03 0.07 1
17 Mayor's reelection times -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 1
18 Number of political party supporting mayor 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 1
19 Unemployment rate (%) -0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.14 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1
20 Senior citizens (%) -0.12 0.26 0.73 0.69 0.05 0.63 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.01 0.03 -0.12 -0.09 0.30 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.17 0.09 1
21 Prefecture dummy -0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.14 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.14 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.16 1
22 Special status city dummy -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.01 1
23 Year dummy 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
 
TABLE 2, (CORRELATION MATRIX) 
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TABLE 3, (NPM AND MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE: RESULTS FROM RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS) 
  
Gender repre-
sentation  
Administrative 
costs  
Local gov-
ernment 
officials 
Personnel 
costs 
Revenues 
from munici-
pal assets 
sale 
Accumulated 
municipal 
debts 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
NPM reform index -0.07 -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Controls 
      
Municipal merger 0.23 0.06* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.07 0.21*** 
 
(0.53) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Female mayor or vice mayor 0.19 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.11* 0.00 
 
(0.79) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Mayor's vote share (%) 0.01* -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mayor's reelection times -0.29* 0.01 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.18) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Number of political party supporting mayor 0.12 -0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 
(0.13) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.04 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03* 0.01 
 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Senior citizens (%) -0.12** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01* 0.05*** 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Special status city dummy -1.44 -0.22*** 0.00 0.11*** 0.30*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.99) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prefecture dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.80*** 3.07*** 0.88*** 3.53*** 0.82*** 5.01*** 
 
(2.42) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.19) (0.11) 
       
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,610 1,619 
Number of municipality 810 810 810 810 809 810 
R-sq within 0.0506 0.0275 0.0309 0.0853 0.00478 0.0488 
R-sq between 0.278 0.539 0.652 0.630 0.156 0.738 
R-sq overall 0.261 0.500 0.652 0.627 0.107 0.737 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
Standard errors are clustered by municipality 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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FIGURE 1, (PERCENT SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM EFFORT) 
 
FIGURE 2, (PERCENT SUMMARY OF NPM INDEX) 
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FIGURE 3, (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS/CAPITA AS NPM REFORM 
INDEX CHANGES) 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1  
TABLE A1, (NPM AND MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE: RESULTS FROM POOLED OLS REGRESSION 
MODELS) 
  
Gender repre-
sentation  
Administrative 
costs  
Local gov-
ernment 
officials 
Personnel 
costs 
Revenues 
from munici-
pal assets 
sale 
Accumulated 
municipal 
debts 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
NPM reform index -0.10 -0.02*** -0.01** -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Controls 
      
Municipal merger 0.18 0.06* 0.05*** 0.03** -0.06 0.21*** 
 
(0.53) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Female mayor or vice mayor 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.11* -0.03 
 
(1.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mayor's vote share (%) 0.01 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mayor's reelection times -0.36* 0.02* 0.01* 0.02** 0.00 -0.02 
 
(0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Number of political party supporting mayor 0.36* -0.02** -0.01 -0.00 -0.02* 0.01 
 
(0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.04 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03* 0.01 
 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Senior citizens (%) -0.12** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 
 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Special status city dummy -1.52 -0.20*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.31*** 0.65*** 
 
(1.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prefecture dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.78*** 3.12*** 0.92*** 3.52*** 0.85*** 5.04*** 
 
(2.44) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.11) 
       
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,610 1,619 
R-squared 0.26 0.50 0.66 0.63 0.11 0.74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
Standard errors are clustered by municipality 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2 
TABLE A21 (NPM AND MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE: RESULTS FROM POPULATION-AVERAGED 
REGRESSION MODELS)  
  
Gender repre-
sentation  
Administrative 
costs  
Local gov-
ernment 
officials 
Personnel 
costs 
Revenues 
from munici-
pal assets 
sale 
Accumulated 
municipal 
debts 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable 
 
          
NPM reform index -0.07 -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Controls 
      
Municipal merger 0.23 0.06* 0.05*** 0.03* -0.06* 0.21*** 
 
(0.52) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
Female mayor or vice mayor 0.18 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.11* 0.00 
 
(0.78) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Mayor's vote share (%) 0.01* -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mayor's reelection times -0.29* 0.01 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Number of political party supporting mayor 0.13 -0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 
(0.13) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.04 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03* 0.01 
 
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Senior citizens (%) -0.12** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01* 0.05*** 
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Special status city dummy -1.45 -0.21*** 0.00 0.11*** 0.30*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.98) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prefecture dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.80*** 3.07*** 0.88*** 3.53*** 0.83*** 5.01*** 
 
(2.37) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.10) 
       
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,610 1,619 
Number of municipality 810 810 810 810 809 810 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
